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SALIX V. USFS; WHEN IS AGENCY CONSULTATION 




Nos. 13-35624 and 13-35631 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Oral Argument: Monday, July 7, 2014, 9:00 a.m. in the Portland 




 Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has been called the 
“heart of the ESA” because it requires interagency consultation before 
undertaking actions that may harm endangered species.1 In Salix v. 
United States Forest Service, the United States District Court held the 
United States Forest Service (USFS) had to reinitiate consultation on a 
management plan amendment after the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
belatedly designated critical habitat for the Canada lynx.2 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit will address two other issues common t  ESA challenges, 
standing and injunctive relief, in addition to the § 7 consultation 
requirement. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In 2000, FWS listed the entire population of the Canada lynx in the 
contiguous U.S. as a threatened species under the ESA.3 The listing 
necessarily involved a significant area of federal land managed by 
USFS.4 As mandated by § 7 of the ESA, USFS consulted withFWS on 
the Northern Rockies Lynx Amendment (Amendment) to supplement 
USFS management plans.5 At the time of consultation, FWS had not 
listed any critical habitat for the lynx on USFS lands despite the statutory 
requirement that it do so at the time of species listing.6 Despite this error, 
FWS approved the Amendment and USFS supplemented 20 national 
forest management plans in a single Record of Decision.7 
 In 2009, FWS finally designated lynx critical habitat in 11 national 
forests, almost ten years after the species was listed.8 Plaintiffs Nolan 
                                         
1 W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 495 (9th Cir. 2011). 
2 Salix v. U.S. Forest Serv., 944 F. Supp. 2d 984 (D. Mont. 2013).   
3 Id. at 986. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1563 (a)(2) (1973). 
6 Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1553 (b)(6)(C) (2003). 
7 Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 987. 
8 Id. 
14 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 75 
Salix and the Cottonwood Environmental Law Center (CELC), bringing 
suit under the ESA’s citizen suit provision, contend d USFS should have 
reinitiated consultation on the Amendment after thecritical habitat 
designation.9 While § 7 remained central to this case, the court also 
addressed two other issues in detail: whether the plaintiff had Article III 
standing and whether specific or broad injunctive relief was justified.10  
 The court first held the environmental plaintiffs e tablished the three 
elements of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.11 
Specifically, the plaintiffs successfully argued that USFS’s failure to 
reinitiate consultation with FWS threatened lynx habit t and, as a result, 
the plaintiff’s opportunity to view lynx in the wild.12 While the federal 
defendants claimed the plaintiffs needed to challenge each of the 20 
management plans separately to establish standing, the court vehemently 
disagreed.13 Citing Ninth Circuit case law, the court held, “plaintiffs may 
challenge a programmatic regulation that affects multiple forests so long 
as they allege a particularized injury in a specific area that is affected by 
the regulation and that will be subject to an agency action that relies on 
the regulation.”14  The court also found irrelevant the defendant’s 
argument that site specific biological opinions fortwo projects within 
lynx critical habitat undermined the plaintiff’s injury in fact claim.15 
Consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, the court ruled that such site 
specific analysis after the fact cannot cure an initial, procedural failure to 
conduct an environmental review in the first place.16  
 The court also ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the consultation 
issue, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Am ndment was not an 
“agency action” under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA.17 Instead, the court upheld 
Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, a Ninth Circuit case which previously 
rejected the same argument by USFS.18 USFS’s arguments in this case 
were based on NEPA case law and a Tenth Circuit decsion.19 However, 
Ninth Circuit precedent interprets an ESA “agency ation” more broadly 
than a NEPA action, and directly holds forest plans as “ongoing, 
affirmative agency actions.”20 Ultimately, the court held USFS violated 
the ESA when it failed to reinitiate consultation with FWS after a 
statutory triggering event occurred, the lynx critial habitat designation, 
                                         
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 986. 
11 Id. at 987. 
12 Id. at 988. 
13 Salix, 944 F.Supp.2d at 988.  
14 Id. at 989.   
15 Id. at 989–991. 
16 Id.   
17 Id. at 995, 999. 
18 Id. at 999; Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994). 
19 Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 996–998. 
20 Id. at 997–998.  
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and ordered USFS to reinitiate consultation.21 
 The District Court then turned to the relief requested by the 
environmental plaintiffs; an injunction on all USFS projects covered by 
the Amendment.22 While the court noted the broad standard for imposing 
injunctive relief in ESA cases, it also turned to Ninth Circuit precedent 
which directs plaintiffs to show irreparable injury in order to justify such 
relief.23 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed the lack of agency analysis 
would impair their lynx viewing opportunities in two project areas.24 The 
court was not satisfied with this argument because there was “no 
showing that the harm is likely to occur despite th site specific analysis 
or that the harm is irreparable.”25 Thus, the court denied the plaintiff’s 
request for injunctive relief on the specific projects named, or on any 
other project, covered by the Amendment.26  
 
III.  ARGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES’  BRIEF ON APPEAL 
 
A. Environmental Plaintiff-Appellee CELC 
 
 1. Section 7 gives first priority to endangered species, reflecting a 
national policy to protect listed species from harmful agency actions.27 
Injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy in this case because long-
standing U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit preced nt holds an 
injunction to be the necessary remedy when a significa t procedural 
violation of the ESA occurs.28 In ESA cases, “irreparable harm is 
presumed to flow from a failure to properly evaluate the environmental 
impact of an agency action.”29 The defendants mistakenly rely on NEPA 
cases to support their position to the contrary.30 However, the ESA’s 
language shows “Congress intended to depart from the normal 
requirement of showing a likelihood of irreparable harm before an 
injunction issues in cases where an agency has not fulfilled its § 7 
duties.”31 A programmatic injunction is appropriate here, even in the 
absence of site specific challenges and a greater showing of irreparable 
harm.32 Alternatively, even if a showing of irreparable harm is required, 
an injunction is still proper because the plaintiffs have established that 
                                         
21 Id. at 1000.  
22 Id. at 1001–1002. 
23 Id.   
24 Id. at 1002. 
25 Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. 
26 Id. 
27 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).  
28 Pl./Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Reply Br., Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., at 4–7 
(9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2014) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631).  
29 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985). 
30 Pl./Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Reply Br., supra n. 28, at 5–10.  
31 Id. at 9–10. 
32 Id.   
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the Amendment is likely to cause such harm. The lynx was listed under 
the ESA due to the lack of conservation planning on the part of USFS.33 
The current Amendment allows for forest thinning and other actions that 
are harmful to lynx critical habitat.34 Therefore, the application of the 
Amendment should be enjoined until FWS reinitiates consultation to 
avoid harmful agency action.35  
 2. CELC is not required to challenge site-specific projects to 
establish standing in this case. Rather, a “programm tic procedural 
challenge” is sufficient under Ninth Circuit case law. The plaintiffs 
identified three site specific projects where the Amendment applies and 
where they definitely plan to return. They also established imminent, 
concrete, and particularized harm to their esthetic in erest of seeing the 
lynx in the wild; an injury which can be redressed by ruling in CELC’s 
favor.36 
 
B. Amici Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee 
 
 The brief further reinforces CELC’s argument for injunctive relief. 
In short, two tourism businesses contend that keystone species such as 
the lynx are essential to maintain intact ecosystem and the USFS 
violation of § 7 will harm the Greater Yellowstone economy if an 
injunction is not issued.37 
 
C. Federal Defendants-Appellants USFS 
 
 1. CELC failed to show any concrete, particularized injury caused by 
USFS’s decision not to reinitiate consultation on the Amendment. To 
establish standing there must be a distinct, palpable injury.38 Here, CELC 
makes “vague or conclusory assertions about hypothetical or abstract 
harms” which are “devoid of specific facts explaining how the agency’s 
application of the Lynx Amendment injures its members’ concrete 
interests.”39 CELC cannot sidestep the standing requirement by claiming 
this to be a procedural rights case.40 Even if it were, procedural 
challenges like those found in NEPA still require some showing of injury 
in fact apart from the procedural injury.41 CELC fails in this regard 
                                         
33 65 Fed. Reg. 16502, 16082 (March 24, 2000). 
34 Pl./Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Reply Br., supra n. 28, at 17–18. 
35 Id. at 18–19. 
36 Id. at 25–27.  
37 Br. of Amici Curiae Big Wild Adventures & Nat. Exposures in Support of Cottonwood Envtl. Law 
Ctr. and Injunctive Relief, Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., at 2–5 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 
2014) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631). 
38 Ans./Reply Br. on Cross-App. for the Fed. Defs., Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
at 2 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2014) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631). 
39 Id. at 4–6.   
40 Id. at 8–9.  
41 Id. at 10.   
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because it does not contest a site-specific project caused by the 
Amendment’s application.42 Thus, CELC fails to prove injury in fact, 
causation, or redressability and lacks standing in this case. 
 2. Under the ESA, USFS was not required to reinitiate consultation 
on the Amendment because USFS did not trigger § 7 via any action on 
the existing, amended forest plans.43 CELC’s reliance on Pacific Rivers 
is in error because the Supreme Court’s opposite ruling on NEPA land 
use plans overrules the proposition that such plans co stitute ongoing 
agency action.44 The regulatory definition of the term “action” in NEPA 
and the ESA are not “meaningfully different” and thus Pacific Rivers is 
effectively overruled.45 “The ESA, its implementing regulations, and 
binding case law make clear that the mere existence of a forest plan is 
not action.”46  
 3. The district court properly ruled against injunctive relief in this 
case because CELC failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.47 As 
discussed above, “alleging the deprivation of a procedural right” is 
insufficient to prove likely harm.48 Despite CELC’s claims, “Hill did not 
establish a presumption in favor of injunctive relief” in ESA cases.49  
Additionally, CELC’s requests an overly broad injunction because it 
asserted injury for only three projects, but requests to enjoin all projects 
covered by the Amendment.50 
 
 B. Amici Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellants 
 
  The brief further reinforces USFS’s argument that forest plans 
should no longer be considered an agency action under recent case law.51 
Further, the brief reiterates the contention that injunctive relief is not 
automatic in ESA cases and should not be granted here due to a lack of 
irreparable harm.52 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
 As a threshold matter, the Ninth Circuit is likely to affirm the district 
court’s holding in favor of standing. Not only is it rare for standing to fail 
                                         
42 Id. at 14.   
43 Id. at 27.   
44 Id. at 28.   
45 Id. at 29–31.   
46 Id. at 48.  
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 50.  
49 Id. at 53.   
50 Id. at 56–57. 
51 Mot. of Am. Forest Resource Council, Pub. Lands Council, Mont. Wood Prods. Assn. Inc., Mont. 
Logging Assn., Associated Logging Contractors, Inc., Cal. Foresty Assn, and Douglas Timber 
Operators to Appear as Amici Curiae in Support of Fed. Appellants, Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., at 7–11 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2013) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631). 
52 Id. at 23–24.  
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in environmental cases, but the plaintiffs here have lso seemingly 
followed an established framework for success.53 Specifically, the 
plaintiffs contend USFS’s failure to reinitiate consultation threatens the 
lynx and thus their opportunity to see the species in national forests, 
places where they often recreate and intend to return. The plaintiffs are 
also likely to overcome USFS’s site-specific argument against standing.54 
In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to bring a 
facial challenge to a forest plan without requiring a challenge to the 
plan’s specific projects.55  
 The plaintiffs also make a good case on the § 7 issue by relying on 
Pacific Rivers, which clearly held forest plans to be ongoing agency 
actions consistent with ESA consultation requirements.56 USFS’s claim 
that Norton, a 2004 NEPA case, effectively overruled this precedent will 
likely fail given Ninth Circuit precedent construing ESA “agency 
actions” more broadly than NEPA’s counterpart.57 Additionally, USFS’s 
reliance on a Tenth Circuit case which explicitly rejected Pacific Rivers 
will likely fail for two reasons: one, no other Circuit has followed the 
Tenth Circuit’s ruling and, second, the Ninth Circut continued to cite 
Pacific Rivers with approval after Norton.58 Thus, the court will likely 
require USFS to reinitiate consultation because the Amendment is an 
ongoing agency action under the ESA.  
 Finally, the Ninth Circuit will likely affirm the district court’s 
holding against injunctive relief. Not only does the court review the 
denial of an injunction for an abuse of discretion, the plaintiffs here also 
fail to allege specific, irreparable harm. Unless the court finds the 
procedural injury is sufficient to establish harm, the general claim of 
potentially impaired lynx sightings is simply inadequate to demonstrate 
irreparable injury.59 
 
Lower Court: District of Montana Cause No. CV 12-45-M-DLC; 
Honorable Dana L. Christensen, District Court Judge of the United State 
District Court, District of Montana. 
 
Attorney for Appellants: John Philip Meyer, Cottonwood Environmental 
Law Center, Bozeman, Montana and Matt Kenna, Durango, Colorado. 
 
                                         
53 George C. Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Pub. Nat. Resources Law § 8:9, 8:11 (2d ed., C. 
Boardman  2014). 
54 Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011); Pac. Rivers Council v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012). 
55 Id.   
56 Pac. Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at 1056. 
57 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004); Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 681  F.3d 1006, 1024 (9th Cir. 2012). 
58 Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007); Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 997–999.  
59 Nat. Resources Def. Council v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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